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Abstract
This paper characterizes the optimal policy within a dynamic search model of
the labor market with risk-averse workers. In a rst-best allocation of resources,
unemployment benets should provide perfect insurance against the unemployment
risk, layo¤ taxes are necessary to induce employers to internalize the cost of dismiss-
ing an employee but should not be too high in order to allow a desirable reallocation
of workers from low to high productivity jobs, hiring subsidies are needed to par-
tially o¤set the adverse impact of layo¤ taxes on job creation and payroll taxes
should be approximately equal to zero. I obtain an optimal rate of unemployment
which is, in general, di¤erent from the output maximizing rate of unemployment.
When workers have some bargaining power, which prevents the provision of full
insurance, it is optimal to reduce the rate of job creation below the output maxi-
mizing level in order to lower wages and increase the level of unemployment benets.
Thus, layo¤ taxes should typically exceed hiring subsidies which generates enough
surplus to nance at least some of the unemployment benets. The inclusion of
moral hazard does not change this conclusion, unless workers have low bargaining
power.
Keywords: Employment protection, Hiring subsidies, Optimal rate of unem-
ployment, Unemployment insurance
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The design of labor market institutions is among the key determinants of the economic
success or failure of a nation. There is nevertheless no consensus among economists about
the optimal design of such institutions and, in many industrialized countries, the subject
remains at the center of considerable controversies among policy makers. In particular,
there appears to be a fundamental trade-o¤ between the demand for insurance of risk-
averse workers and the macroeconomic e¢ ciency of the labor market which should allocate
workers to the jobs where they are going to be most productive. Hence, a typical concern
is that government interventions aimed at improving insurance, such as the provision of
unemployment benets or employment protection, might have adverse consequences for
aggregate production.
Search frictions are a major source of the trade-o¤ between insurance and production
since they generate some unemployment and they prevent an immediate reallocation of
workers from low to high productivity jobs.1 A macroeconomic framework is required
to analyze this trade-o¤ since search frictions induce non-trivial general equilibrium ef-
fects on job creation and job destruction which are key to the reallocation process of
workers. Furthermore, wages could be a¤ected by macroeconomic variables such as the
expected length of an unemployment spell. These general equilibrium e¤ects imply that
di¤erent labor market policy instruments do interact among each other. Hence, these
instruments jointly inuence the provision of insurance and the e¢ ciency of production.
They therefore need to be analyzed jointly.
A search model à la Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) with risk-averse workers captures
the trade-o¤ between insurance and production as well as the aforementioned general
equilibrium e¤ects and allows for a joint analysis of the di¤erent policy instruments. In
this paper, I therefore rely on such a framework to determine the main characteristics of
an optimal labor market policy. Employment protection takes the form of layo¤ taxes.
The government can also provide hiring subsidies in order to encourage job creation.
The generosity of unemployment insurance is determined by the level of unemployment
benets. Payroll taxes could be used to raise revenue. If they happen to take negative
values, payroll taxes could also be seen as employment subsidies. Importantly, it is
assumed throughout, as in most of the literature on the topic, that the government is the
sole provider of unemployment insurance.2
1The other major source of the trade-o¤ is moral hazard which will be allowed for in the last section
of this paper.
2The implicit contract literature has argued that risk-neutral rms should be expected to provide
unemployment benets to risk-averse workers; see, for instance, Baily (1974a) or Azariadis (1975). How-
ever, in reality, such contracts remain the exception rather than the rule. Thus, although somewhat
ad-hoc, the assumption that the private market does not provide insurance seems reasonable and has the
merit of making the analysis transparent. This assumption has nevertheless been relaxed in the optimal
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I begin by deriving the optimal allocation of resources chosen by a planner who wants
to maximize the welfare of workers subject to matching frictions and to a resource con-
straint. In this ideal setup, full insurance is provided and aggregate output, net of recruit-
ment costs, is maximized. It turns out that this rst-best allocation can be implemented
in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers. To obtain an e¢ cient rate of
job destruction, layo¤taxes should induce rms to internalize the social costs and benets
of dismissing a worker. The costs consist of the unemployment benets that will need
to be paid and of the forgone payroll taxes; while the benets correspond to the value
of a desirable reallocation of the worker from a low to a high productivity job. Hiring
subsidies are needed to partially o¤set the negative impact of layo¤ taxes on job creation.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, payroll taxes should optimally be approximately set
equal to zero. Thus, both unemployment benets and hiring subsidies are almost entirely
nanced from layo¤ taxes.
Importantly, my analysis naturally denes a welfare maximizing optimal rate of unem-
ployment. If full insurance cannot be provided, then this optimal rate of unemployment
is generically di¤erent from the output maximizing rate of unemployment commonly
emphasized in the search and matching literature.
I then turn to the characterization of the optimal policy when workers have some
bargaining power, which prevents the provision of full insurance. Relying on numerical
simulations, I show that the planner typically chooses to set layo¤ taxes higher than
hiring subsidies such as to discourage the entry of rms with a vacant position. This
reduces market tightness and, hence, wages which, by relaxing the resource constraint,
makes it possible to increase the level of unemployment benets.
I then allow for moral hazard. This generates the opposite possibility that insurance
may be too high, in which case the planner wants to increase market tightness. However,
the simulations reveal that an insu¢ cient provision of insurance remains the main concern
whenever workers have substantial bargaining power. Thus, moral hazard does not seem
to be the most important feature of the fundamental trade-o¤ between the provision of
insurance and the level of aggregate production. General equilibrium e¤ects on wages
and on job creation and job destruction seem to be at least as important.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the extensive economic literature on the optimal design of la-
bor market institutions. The main strand of this literature focuses on the provision of
unemployment insurance. In their seminal work, Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini (1997) focused on a single unemployment spell and derived the optimal
policy analyses of Chetty Saez (2010) and Fella Tyson (2011).
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time prole of unemployment benets when moral hazard introduces a trade-o¤ between
the provision of insurance and the provision of incentives to search. By contrast, Baily
(1974b) and Chetty (2006) focused on the level of benets, rather than their time prole,
in a framework which allows for multiple spells. Importantly, these contributions assume
that unemployment benets are exclusively nanced from payroll taxes and abstract from
general equilibrium e¤ects.
The literature on employment protection is mostly positive, rather than normative.
The crux of the academic debate is about the impact of layo¤taxes on the level of employ-
ment; with the underlying presumption that layo¤ taxes are desirable if they decrease the
number of jobless workers. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) showed, in a partial equilibrium
context, that ring costs have a larger impact on job destruction than on job creation and
should therefore be benecial for employment. This conclusion was challenged by the gen-
eral equilibrium analysis with employment lotteries of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
Ljungqvist (2002) showed that, in search models à la Mortensen-Pissarides, layo¤ costs
increase employment if initial wages are negotiated before a match is formed, while the
opposite is true if bargaining only occurs after the match is formed. Importantly, these
contributions either assume that workers are risk-neutral or that nancial markets are
complete. Hence, they do not generate any trade-o¤ between insurance and production
e¢ ciency and cannot give sensible measures of the welfare implications of layo¤ taxes.
These analyses are therefore hardly informative about the optimal level of employment
protection.
While most papers ignore the interaction between di¤erent policy instruments, there
are two important exceptions which are closely related to this work. First, Mortensen
and Pissarides (2003)3 analyze labor market policies in a dynamic search model with
risk-neutral workers. Since there is no need for insurance, the best that the government
can do is to maximize output net of recruitment costs. If the Hosios (1990) condition
holds, i.e. the bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of the matching
function, then it is optimal for the government not to intervene; while, if it does not hold,
policy parameters should only be used to correct for the resulting search externalities.
An important insight is that the introduction of unemployment benets has a positive
impact on wages and, therefore, increases job destruction. This should be o¤set by higher
layo¤ taxes. Hiring subsidies should also be increased such as to leave the rate of job
creation unchanged.4 However, with risk-neutral workers, there is no trade-o¤ between
insurance and production.5
3See also Mortensen Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000, chapter 9).
4Importantly, Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) do not impose an aggregate resource constraint. When
such a constraint is imposed, the level of unemployment benets can no longer be set as a free parameter.
This explains why the resource constraint plays a key role in my characterization of the optimal policy
when workers have some bargaining power.
5Interestingly, Schuster (2010) extends the Mortensen Pissarides (2003) framework by adding a job
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The second closely related paper is Blanchard Tirole (2008) which proposes a joint
derivation of optimal unemployment insurance and employment protection in a static
context with risk-averse workers. In their benchmark model, they show that unemploy-
ment benets should be entirely nanced from layo¤ taxes, rather than payroll taxes, in
order to induce rms to internalize the social cost of unemployment.6 However, their sta-
tic framework does not have a job creation margin and therefore ignores the adverse e¤ect
of layo¤ taxes on job creation. In fact, as we shall see, in a dynamic context the share
of unemployment benets nanced from payroll taxes is determined by the job creation
side of the economy. Also, and more fundamentally, a static approach entails an entirely
negative view of unemployment; whereas in a dynamic setting an unemployed worker is
a useful input in the matching process. In fact, a well-known result from the search and
matching literature is that, to maximize output in an economy without governmental
intervention, the bargaining power of workers that satises the Hosios condition actually
maximizes the rate of job destruction!
Finally, this paper is also related to a small literature on policy analyses within dy-
namic search models of the labor market with risk-averse workers. Cahuc Lehmann
(2000), Fredriksson Holmlund (2001) and Lehmann van der Linden (2007) focus on the
optimal provision of unemployment insurance under moral hazard. All three contributions
pay particular attention to the general equilibrium e¤ects of unemployment insurance.
More specically, they emphasize that an increase in benets leads to an increase in
wages which reduces the rate of job creation. Along similar lines, Krusell Mukoyama
Sahin (2010) investigate the optimal provision of unemployment insurance in a search
model where the accumulation of risk-free savings is the only source of private insurance
available to risk-averse workers. They show that, even in the absence of moral hazard, the
adverse impact of unemployment insurance on job creation is so large that the optimal
replacement ratio is close to zero. It should be mentioned that none of these papers allow
for the possibility of using hiring subsidies and ring taxes to control the rates of job
creation and job destruction.
Acemoglu Shimer (1999, 2000) showed, in the context of directed search with risk-
averse workers, that higher unemployment benets could improve the quality, and pro-
ductivity, of job-worker matches. By contrast, in this paper, match quality is unrelated to
the length of unemployment. Alavarez Veracierto (2000, 2001) rely on calibrated search
models with risk-averse workers to investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent labor market poli-
acceptance margin. He shows that the implementation of the optimal policy requires additional policy
instruments.
6This policy, often referred to as "experience rating", was originally proposed by Feldstein (1976).
Other related contributions on the topic, and mostly in favor of such policy, include Topel Welch (1980),
Topel (1983), Wang Williamson (2002), Cahuc Malherbet (2004), Mongrain Roberts (2005), Cahuc
Zylberberg (2008) and LHaridon Malherbet (2009).
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cies. However, their approach is entirely positive and does not attempt to characterize
optimal policies.7
In a closely related paper, Coles and Masters (2006) show that there is some comple-
mentarity between the provision of unemployment insurance and that of hiring subsidies.
The idea is that, by boosting the job creation rate, subsidies exert a downward pressure
on unemployment and, hence, on the cost of providing unemployment insurance. How-
ever, their model does not have an endogenous job destruction margin and, therefore,
cannot be used to determine the optimal level of employment protection.
This paper begins, in section two, with a brief reminder of some of the key features
of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework. In the following section, I derive the
rst-best policy, which then serves as a benchmark. Section four relies on numerical
simulations to investigate optimal policies when workers have some bargaining power.
Finally, the last section deals with the consequences of moral hazard. This paper ends
with a conclusion.
2 Search Model
Before characterizing the optimal labor market policies, it is necessary to describe the
main features of the dynamic search model on which I rely throughout this paper. The
structure of the economy corresponds to the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) frame-
work. Time is continuous. Production requires that vacant jobs and unemployed workers
get matched, which occurs at rate:
m = m(u; v); (1)
where u stands for the number of unemployed and v for that of vacancies. For simplicity,
the mass of workers is normalized to one, so that u also stands for the rate of unem-
ployment. The matching function m is increasing in both arguments, exhibits decreasing
marginal product to each input and satises constant returns to scale.
Let  denote market tightness which is dened as the ratio of vacancies to unemploy-
ment, i.e.  = v=u. The rate at which vacant jobs meet unemployed workers is given
by:
m(u; v)
v
= m
u
v
; 1

= m

1

; 1

= q(); (2)
where q() is a decreasing function of . Similarly the rate at which unemployed workers
7Ljungqvist Sargent (2008) also investigate the interactions between unemployment insurance and
employment protection in a positive analysis of the labor market, but with risk-neutral workers.
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nd jobs is:
m(u; v)
u
= m(1; ) = q(): (3)
Clearly, the constant returns to scale assumption implies that market tightness is the key
parameter which summarizes labor market conditions for both unemployed workers and
recruiting rms. The elasticity of the matching function is dened as:8
() =   
q()
dq()
d
: (4)
The other main feature of the Mortensen-Pissarides model is that the productivity of
a match is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Production starts at maximal productivity,
normalized to 1. The idea is that recruiting rms are prosperous and will make a very
e¢ cient use of their additional worker. At Poisson rate , the match is hit by a produc-
tivity shock and a new productivity x 2 [ ; 1] is randomly drawn from the c.d.f. G(x).
The match dissolves if the new productivity is below a threshold R, to be determined.
Note that assuming an initial match productivity equal to 1 ensures that the produc-
tivity of recruiting rms is always well above the job destruction threshold R (which is
a natural assumption to make as, otherwise, these rms would not be posting a vacancy
in the rst place).9 Moreover, the importance of this assumption, which is standard in
the search and matching literature, should not be overstated. Indeed, rms base their
recruiting decisions on the expected net present value of a new match rather than on its
initial productivity.
The remaining features of the model will be given in the following section as the
optimal policy is being derived.
3 First-Best Policy
The optimal policy is derived in two steps. First, I characterize the optimal allocation of
resources chosen by a benevolent social planner. Then, I turn to its implementation in a
decentralized economy with free entry of risk-neutral rms.
8Note that  is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed, i.e.
 = um
@m
@u , and 1   the elasticity with respect to the number of vacancies, i.e. 1   = vm @m@v .
9This justication implicitly considers that, once the rm has spent the necessary amount of time
to recruit a worker, the productivity of that worker will be primarily determined by the productivity of
the rm. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for stochastic job matching is beyond the scope of this
paper. See Schuster (2010) for a related analysis which does allow for a job acceptance margin resulting
from stochastic match productivity at recruitment.
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3.1 Optimal Allocation
The optimal allocation maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function subject to a resource
constraint and to the search frictions that characterize the labor market. It is therefore
the solution to the following problem:
max
f;R;b;wg
Z 1
0
e rt [(1  u)v(w) + uv(z + b)] dt (5)
subject to _u = G(R)(1  u)  q()u (6a)
_y = q()u+ (1  u)
Z 1
R
sdG(s)  y (6b)
(1  u)w + ub = y   cu (6c)
where r stands for the planners (or workers) discount rate, w for the net wage that
an employee receives, z for the value of leisure, b for unemployment benets, y for the
aggregate output of the economy and c for the ow cost of posting a vacancy. The instan-
taneous utility function of risk-averse workers is denoted by10 v(:), which is increasing
and concave.
The planners objective is to maximize intertemporal social welfare, which, according
to a utilitarian criterion, is composed at each instant of the instantaneous utility of u
unemployed and 1   u employed workers.11 The rst constraint depicts the dynamics
of unemployment, driven by the di¤erence between the job destruction ow and the job
creation ow. A match dissolves when it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock that generates
a new productivity below the threshold R, which occurs at rate G(R). This rate of job
destruction applies to the mass 1 u of existing matches. Job creation is simply equal to
the rate at which unemployed workers nd jobs, q(), multiplied by the mass u of job
seekers. It should be emphasized that this rst constraint captures the fact that even the
social planner is subject to matching frictions. The second constraint gives the dynamics
of aggregate output, y. At each instant, q()u new matches are formed and each of these
has a productivity of 1. The 1  u existing jobs are hit at rate  by idiosyncratic shocks
which destroy their current productivity and replaces it, in case of survival, by a randomly
drawn number greater or equal to the threshold R. Finally, any feasible allocation must
10In the previous section v denoted the number of vacancies. However, this variable will not appear in
the rest of the text (except when I dene the matching function under moral hazard in the last section
of the paper). I focus instead on  and u and, where needed, v is just replaced by u.
11An alternative would be to maximize the weighted average between the expected utility of an em-
ployed and of an unemployed worker. Such objective function would be more appropriate in a political
economy context focusing on the conict between insiders and outsiders. However, without time dis-
counting, this would be identical to the planners objective of this paper.
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satisfy the economys aggregate resource constraint.12 The expenses, composed of the
wages paid to the employed and the benets paid to the unemployed, cannot exceed total
output net of the resources allocated to recruitment, which amount to a ow cost c paid
for each of the u vacancies. The planners control variables are market tightness , the
threshold productivity R, the net wage w and the level of unemployment benets b. The
state variables are unemployment u and aggregate output y.
The planners problem is straightforward to solve using standard optimal control
techniques. The rst characteristic of the optimal allocation is that workers are o¤ered
perfect insurance against the unemployment risk:
w = z + b, (7)
which is a direct consequence of workersrisk aversion, i.e. of the concavity of v(:). This
can be combined with the resource constraint, (6c), to give the optimal value of w and b:
w = y   cu+ zu; (8)
b = y   cu  z(1  u): (9)
Note that perfect insurance necessitates a replacement ratio smaller than one whenever
the value z of leisure is strictly positive.
The optimal values of  and R are implicitly determined by the following two rst-
order conditions:
[1  ()] 1 R
r + 
=
c
q()
; (10)
R = z +
()
1  ()c  

r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s); (11)
where () denotes the elasticity of the matching function, cf. equation (4). These two
optimality conditions are exactly identical to the ones derived in Pissarides (2000, chapter
8) for net output maximization.13 This is not surprising as, when nothing prevents the
provision of full insurance, the best that the planner can do is to maximize output. The
rst equation, (10), guarantees an optimal rate of job creation. The cost of job creation
consists of the ow cost of having a vacancy, c, multiplied by the expected time that
has to be spent before a worker could be found, 1=q(). The value of a newly created
match is equal to (1   R)=(r + ). However, optimally, recruitment costs should only
12Replacing the resource constraint (6c) by an intertemporal resource constraint would not change any
of the results provided that the interest rate at which the planner can transfer resources across time is
equal to the planners discount rate.
13Under risk neutrality, the objective of the planner is to maximize the net present value of the ow
of net output, where this ow is given by y   cu+ uz.
9
absorb a fraction 1  () of this value as, otherwise, there is too much job creation and
an excessive amount of resources is allocated to recruitment. Equation (11) ensures an
optimal rate of job destruction. In the static context of Blanchard Tirole (2008), the
optimal threshold is just equal to the value of leisure, i.e. R = z. Making the model
dynamic yields two extra terms. First, when a low productivity job is destroyed, the
corresponding worker returns to unemployment with the hope of nding a new job with
productivity 1. To make this explicit, the corresponding term of equation (11) can be
rewritten, using (10), as:
()
1  ()c = q()()
1 R
r + 
,
= q()

1 R
r + 
  c
q()

: (12)
This says that, once a job is destroyed, an unemployed worker gets matched at rate q()
which generates a social value of (1   R)=(r + ) net of the expected recruitment cost
c=q(). In other words, the threshold R has to be su¢ ciently high to induce an e¢ cient
reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. The second additional term
to the expression for the optimal threshold R corresponds to the option value of a match.
Even if current productivity is very low, keeping the match alive preserves the option of
being hit by an idiosyncratic shock that restores a protable level of productivity. The
option value decreases the optimal threshold R.
In steady state, the optimal allocation of resources chosen by a benevolent social
planner is fully characterized by the rst-order conditions (7), (10) and (11) together
with the constraints (6a), (6b) and (6c) with _u = _y = 0.
3.2 Implementation
Having characterized the optimal allocation, I now turn to its implementation in a de-
centralized economy. Throughout the paper, I restrict the government to rely exclusively
on the following four policy instruments: unemployment benets b, payroll taxes  , layo¤
taxes F and hiring subsidies H. I choose to focus on these four as they are the most nat-
ural instruments through which the government can in practice a¤ect the labor market.14
Moreover, as we shall see in this section, they are su¢ cient to implement the rst-best
allocation of resources in a benchmark case.
In the decentralized economy, four stages of interest can be distinguished.
 Stage 1: The government chooses the level of unemployment benets b, payroll
14In practice, the minimum wage also is a very important labor market policy instrument. However,
any meaningful analysis of the minimum wage must allow for heterogeneity among workers, which is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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taxes  , layo¤ taxes F and hiring subsidies H.
 Stage 2: Entrepreneurs decide whether or not to create a rmwith a vacant position.
 Stage 3: Once a match occurs, the employer and employee agree on a wage rate.
 Stage 4: Each rm chooses a threshold productivity R below which the match
dissolves.
I now proceed backward and start by determining the threshold R chosen at Stage
4 by a risk-neutral employer. The asset value of a producing rm with productivity x,
J(x), solves the following Bellman equation:
rJ(x) = x  (w + ) + 
Z 1
R
J(s)dG(s)  G(R)F   J(x); (13)
where r denotes the risk-free interest rate, which is taken to be identical to the planners
discount rate, w the net wage that the worker receives and w +  the gross wage paid
by the employer. This Bellman equation states that, for a rm, the ow return from
having a lled job with productivity x is equal to the instantaneous surplus it generates
to which the possibility of a change in productivity should be added. An idiosyncratic
shock destroys the value of the rm at the current productivity and replaces it by either a
corresponding expression, if the new productivity is above the threshold, or by the cost of
layo¤15, if the match is to be destroyed. As J(x) is strictly increasing in x, the employer
chooses a job destruction threshold R which is determined by:
J(R) =  F: (14)
This says that, at the threshold, the employer is indi¤erent between closing down and
continuing the relationship. Simple algebra16 on (13) and (14) gives the expression for
the value of R chosen by rms:
R = w +    rF   
r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s): (15)
The threshold productivity is smaller than the cost of labor because of the ring tax and
of the option value of continuing the match. Note that, for this to be possible, rms
15Throughout this paper, it is assumed that rms are able to pay the layo¤ tax. Blanchard and Tirole
(2008) investigate the consequences of having employers constrained by shallow pockets. See also Tirole
(2010) for a deeper analysis on the topic which allows for extended liability to third parties in the context
of employment protection.
16An analytic expression for the function J(:) can be obtained by taking the di¤erence between equation
(13) evaluated at x and the same equation evaluated atR. This expression for J(:) can then be substituted
into (13) evaluated at R. Finally, using the value of J(R) given by (14) yields (15).
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must be able to borrow and lend from perfect nancial markets, an assumption that is
maintained throughout this paper. Equation (15) is our rst implementability constraint:
the decentralized job destruction condition.
Let us now turn to the determination of the wage rate that occurs at Stage 3. The
formation of a match generates a surplus that needs to be shared between the two parties.
But, from equation (7), at the optimum the net wage w paid to a worker must be equal to
the wage equivalent of being unemployed z + b. This immediately leads to the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 A necessary condition to implement the rst-best allocation is that workers
are wage takers and that all the match surplus is captured by the rm. This guarantees
that, as desired:
w = z + b: (16)
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If workers have some bargaining power,
they will obtain a mark-up over and above their outside option which is the income
they get while unemployed. But this prevents the provision of full insurance which is
a characteristic of a rst-best allocation.17 Clearly, with a binding resource constraint
(6c) and perfect insurance, the optimal values of w and b are still given by (8) and (9),
respectively.
The requirement that workers have no bargaining power could be seen as an important
benchmark.18 In the context of this paper, it could also be seen as part of the optimal
policy to be implemented. For example, the labor market could be organized in such a
way that rms and workers rst meet without exchanging any information on the wage
rate. Then, rms make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to workers.19
Finally, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of the above lemma:
Corollary 1 The rst-best allocation cannot be implemented when the Hosios condition
holds, i.e. when the bargaining power of workers is equal the elasticity of the matching
function ().
The Hosios condition balances search externalities on both sides of the labor market such
that, without government intervention, output is maximized. It is, however, inconsistent
with the provision of perfect insurance. Since, in the rst-best allocation, output is
maximized and workers must have zero bargaining power, the optimal policy will need to
17In their benchmark case, Blanchard and Tirole (2008) also assume that the bargaining power of
workers is nil. Thus, the rst-best benchmark derived in this section is a dynamic counterpart to theirs.
18Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that workers have a bargaining power close to 0.05, which
suggests that this benchmark is not necessarily implausible.
19In an environment with Nash bargaining, an alternative solution, proposed by Lehmann and van der
Linden (2007), consists in setting a marginal rate of income taxation equal to 100%.
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correct the rates of job creation and job destruction for the failure of the Hosios condition
to hold.
Stage 2 is solved by assuming free entry. Vacancies keep being created by entrepre-
neurs until the returns from doing so reduce to zero. More formally, the value V of a
vacant position solves:
rV =  c+ q() [J(1) +H   V ] : (17)
This states that the return from a vacancy consists of the ow cost c of recruitment and
of the possibility of lling the position at rate q() which yields the value of an active
rm with productivity 1. The employer also qualies for a hiring subsidy H when he
hires a worker. Free entry implies:
V = 0: (18)
The amount of job creation can then be determined by plugging (18) into (17) and by
using the value of J(1) deduced from (13) and (14). This gives:
1 R
r + 
  F = c
q()
 H: (19)
The left hand side is the value of a new match to a rm, J(1); while the right hand
side corresponds to the expected cost of recruiting a worker. Equation (19) is our second
implementability condition: the decentralized job creation condition.
At Stage 1, the government needs to choose the optimal policy. The corresponding
implementability condition is the usual government budget constraint:
(1  u) + (1  u)G(R)F = ub+ uq()H: (20)
Revenues consist of payroll taxes paid by employed workers and of layo¤ taxes applied to
the job destruction ow; while the expenses are the payment of benets to the unemployed
and of hiring subsidies to the ow of newly created jobs.
It is now straightforward to solve for the optimal policy by matching the imple-
mentability conditions of the decentralized economy to the equations that characterize
the rst-best allocation of resources. More specically, H and F must be chosen such
that (19) reduces to (10) and (15) to (11). This gives:
F  H = ()1 R
r + 
; (21)
rF = b+    ()
1  ()c; (22)
where  and R are jointly determined by (10) and (11). These are key equations char-
acterizing the optimal policy in the benchmark model. They ensure that the rate of job
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creation and job destruction prevailing in the decentralized economy coincide with the
planners optimum.
These conditions have a potentially insightful interpretation. Let us start with the
implementation of the optimal level of job creation, (21). Equation (10) implies that,
under free entry, rms should only capture a fraction 1  () of the match surplus; oth-
erwise, entry is too high and too many resources are allocated to recruitment. However,
employers have all the bargaining power and this must be o¤set by setting a ring tax
that exceeds the hiring subsidy such as to absorb a fraction () of the match surplus
which reduces job creation to an e¢ cient level.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the equation implementing the optimal level
of job destruction, (22). As can be seen from (15), a layo¤tax only a¤ects the threshold R
if rms discount the future, i.e. if r > 0. Indeed, any match will eventually be destroyed
and, hence, by not laying o¤ its worker now, the rm is only postponing the payment of
the tax. Thus the relevant cost imposed by the layo¤ tax is rF , rather than just F .
A rm that dismisses its worker imposes a double externality on the nancing of
unemployment insurance. First, the worker will qualify for benets and, second, he
will no longer contribute to its funding by paying payroll taxes. The layo¤ tax should
therefore be su¢ ciently high to ensure that employers internalize these e¤ects. This is
the main message of Blanchard Tirole (2008).20 The additional insight that is obtained
by extending the analysis to a dynamic context is that there is also a social benet from
laying o¤ a worker: it allows a desirable reallocation of this worker from a low to a high
productivity job. This is captured by the third term of equation (22) which was given
an intuitive interpretation when the optimal allocation was derived, cf. equation (12).
This e¤ect reduces the net social cost of dismissal and, hence, the level of the optimal
layo¤ tax. Interestingly, the option value of keeping the match alive is properly taken
into account by rms and therefore does not a¤ect the size of the optimal layo¤ tax.
The level of payroll taxes is simply pinned down by the remaining implementability
constraint, i.e. by the government budget constraint, (20). Using the fact that, in steady
state, the job destruction ow is equal to the job creation ow, (1  u)G(R) = uq(),
we obtain:
 =
u
1  u [b  q()(F  H)] : (23)
An important insight from this analysis is that the job destruction side of the economy
determines the level of layo¤taxes, F ; while the job creation side determines the di¤erence
between layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies, F  H. Note that this result is fundamentally
20In fact, in Blanchard Tirole (2008) payroll taxes do not appear as they should optimally be set
equal to zero. However, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008), who propose a generalization to the case where
the government needs to raise taxes on income in order to redistribute wealth across heterogeneous
individuals, did explicitly have them a¤ecting the level of layo¤ taxes.
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due to the implementability conditions, (15) and (19), and will therefore remain true in
all extensions of the benchmark model. An important implication, which follows from
(23), is that the share of unemployment benets nanced from payroll taxes is essentially
determined from the job creation side of the economy, a margin that is absent from
Blanchard Tirole (2008).
Further insights on the optimal level of payroll taxes can be gained by replacing F H
in (23) by its value from (21), which, after some straightforward rearrangement using (10),
yields:
 =
u
1  u

b  q()

1 R
r + 
  c
q()

: (24)
The ow b of unemployment benets constitutes the social cost of having an unemployed
worker. The second term represents the corresponding social benet. Indeed, at rate
q(), an unemployed nds a job which generates a social value equal to the expected
prots from production net of the recruitment costs.
Since the optimal rate of unemployment should ensure that the social benet from
joblessness is not too distant from its social cost, we expect the two terms of the main
bracket of (24) to be close to each other. In fact, with time discounting, we expect the
rst term to be slightly larger than the second one since the benet will only be realized
in the future. This intuition is formally conrmed by rewriting the expression for the
payroll tax, (24), as:
 =
r
r + 
u

y
1  u  R

: (25)
This expression is derived in Appendix A. Hence, without time discounting, i.e. r = 0,
payroll taxes are not part of the rst-best policy. In this case, both unemployment
insurance and hiring subsidies should be nanced, exclusively, from layo¤ taxes.
The intuition is that the optimal rate of unemployment is such that the social cost is
equal to the social benet of having an unemployed worker. The key element is that, with
free entry and zero bargaining power to workers, the social benet is entirely captured
by the government as scal revenue. Similarly, the social cost, i.e. the unemployment
benets, is a government expense. Hence, the two cancel out of the budget constraint
and payroll taxes can be set equal to zero.
The optimal policy can now be fully characterized.
Proposition 1 When workers are wage takers, the rst-best allocation can be imple-
mented in a decentralized economy by choosing the values of the policy instruments b, H,
F and  that jointly satisfy equations (9), (21), (22) and (25).
Knowing that the rst-best allocation is implementable, we can derive the equilibrium
rate of unemployment by setting _u = 0 in equation (6a) determining the dynamics of
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unemployment. This yields the well known expression:
u =
G(R)
G(R) + q()
; (26)
where  and R are jointly determined by (10) and (11). This equation nevertheless has
an interesting new interpretation in this framework. Whereas, with risk-neutral workers,
this is the output maximizing rate of unemployment21; here, given the microfoundations
laid in terms of risk-averse workers, this is the optimal rate of unemployment. Not only
could unemployment be too low from an output maximization perspective, it could also
be too low from a welfare point of view, which is conceptually very di¤erent.
Here, the output maximizing and optimal rates of unemployment coincide. However,
this only occurs because full insurance is provided at the optimum. For instance, as-
sume that there is a xed non-insurable utility cost B > 0 of being unemployed. Thus,
in the planners problem (5), social welfare at each instant is given by (1   u)v(w) +
u [v(x+ b) B] (rather than (1   u)v(w) + uv(x + b)). This specication is consistent
with the happiness literature which has provided extensive evidence that unemployment
has a long-lasting negative e¤ect on life satisfaction.22
As the unemployeds marginal utility of consumption is not a¤ected by B, it remains
optimal to set w = z+ b. The welfare loss from unemployment is therefore not insurable.
It can be shown that the planner nevertheless nds it optimal to mitigate the problem by
reducing the rate of job destruction below its output maximizing level such as to reduce
the rate of unemployment. Thus, in that case, the optimal rate of unemployment is below
the output maximizing rate of unemployment.
4 Workers with Bargaining Power
Under risk aversion, it is desirable to suppress any uctuations in income between em-
ployment and unemployment spells. Hence, the implementation of a rst-best allocation
requires workers to have zero bargaining power, as stated in Lemma 1. However, it could
be objected that workers fundamentally do have some bargaining power and that this
cannot be inuenced by the planner. Thus, when solving for the optimal policy, the
expression for the wage rate resulting from the bargaining process should be added as an
extra constraint to the planners problem.
An obvious limitation of the analysis of this section is that it does not allow for private
savings.23 When workers have some bargaining power, their income uctuates over time
21This is often referred to as the "e¢ cient rate of unemployment" in the search and matching literature
with risk-neutral workers.
22See, for example, Clark Diener Georgellis Lucas (2008).
23Unfortunately, this limitation is not uncommon. Indeed, most of the papers mentioned in the
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which should induce them to accumulate some precautionary savings in order to avoid
sharp drops in consumption when unemployed. It should nevertheless be acknowledged
that, in practice, many employees hardly accumulate any savings. Wol¤ (1998) reports
that, in 1995, the mean net worth of the lowest two quintiles of the wealth distribution
in the U.S. amounted to only $900. If we exclude home equity, which is not su¢ ciently
liquid to provide adequate insurance against unemployment, the mean net worth of the
bottom 40% of the population was minus $10 600. These workers with negative nancial
wealth are very likely to be borrowing constrained while unemployed, i.e. they cannot
increase their borrowings such as to consume more than their current income. This
evidence suggests that the no-savings benchmark is empirically relevant for a signicant
fraction of workers, especially at the lower end of the skill distribution. Hence, assuming
that workers can easily accumulate some precautionary savings is not necessarily more
realistic than assuming that workers have to consume their cash-on-hand at each instant.
Moreover, allowing for private savings would reduce the demand for insurance but would
presumably not fundamentally change the qualitative insights which I emphasize in this
section.
4.1 The Planners Problem
Before setting up the planners problem, it is necessary to solve the bargaining problem
between the worker and the rm.
When a match is formed, the rm and the worker bargain over an entire wage schedule,
as a function of productivity, fw(x)gx2[R;1], and on a job destruction threshold R. Indeed,
as the rm is risk-neutral and the worker risk-averse, it is quite natural that they initially
bargain on a state-contingent contract which allows the risk-neutral rm to commit to
absorb some of the future productivity risk facing the match. This employment contract
is determined by Nash bargaining. If an agreement is not reached, the employer does not
receive the hiring subsidy but does not have to pay the layo¤ tax. Thus, the employment
contract is determined by:
n
fw(x)gx2[R;1] ; R
o
= arg max
ffwi(x)gx2[Ri;1];Rig
[Wi(1)  U ] [Ji(1) +H   V ]1  ; (27)
where the expected utility of an unemployed, U , and of an employed worker in match i
introduction on the optimal provision of unemployment insurance within matching models of the labor
market also abstract from private savings.
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with productivity x, Wi(x), are implicitly given by:
rU = v(z + b) + q() [W (1)  U ] ; (28)
rWi(x) = v(wi(x)) + 
Z 1
Ri
Wi(s)dG(s) + G(Ri)U   Wi(x); (29)
where, as before, v(:) stands for the instantaneous utility of consumption.24 The subscript
i in the bargaining problem (27) and in the value of employment to a worker (29) is used
to stress that the wage rates and the threshold productivity bargained in match i do not
a¤ect the values of the outside options, i.e. the values of U or V .
The implicit contract literature suggests that risk-neutral rms might be willing to
provide their risk-averse workers with insurance against unemployment. However, note
that, in the absence of savings, a severance payment cannot be used as an insurance
device. If, instead, rms are allowed to provide unemployment insurance to their for-
mer employees until they receive a job o¤er, then they will choose to provide perfect
insurance. In that situation, as in the benchmark case of Section 3, the government can
implement the rst-best allocation of resources and the corresponding policy can easily
be characterized analytically. However, this case is neither theoretically interesting nor
empirically relevant. Hence (as mentioned in footnote 2), I rule out transfers from a rm
to a worker after their work relationship has ended.
As shown in Appendix B, the wage schedule and the job destruction threshold that
solve (27) are jointly determined by the following three equations. First, the wage rate
is independent of productivity:
w(x) = w for all x 2 [R; 1]: (30)
Thus, the risk-neutral rm absorbs all the productivity risk. The workers net salary w
is determined by:
v(w)  v(z + b)
v0(w)
= [r + G(R) + q()]

1  
c
q()
; (31)
and the job destruction threshold solves:
R = w +    rF   
r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s)  r + G(R)
r + G(R) + q()
v(w)  v(z + b)
v0(w)
: (32)
Note that the last term of this job destruction condition would not appear in the absence
of commitment, cf. (15). This shows that rms use both margins to provide insurance
24The value of a producing rm with productivity x, J(x), is given by (13) with the wage rate indexed
to productivity x.
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to risk-averse workers: they pay a constant wage and they lower the job destruction
threshold.
Relying on the free-entry condition, Appendix C shows that the decentralized job
creation condition is:
(1  )

1 R
r + 
+H   F

=
c
q()
: (33)
The optimal policy can then be derived by adding the wage equation (31) as a constraint
to the original problem. Thus, the planner should maximize (5) with respect to , R,
b and w subject to (6a), (6b), (6c) and (31). The three remaining implementability
constraints, (32), (33) and (20), can be left out since they jointly determine F , H and 
which do not appear elsewhere in the planners problem.
It turns out that, unlike in the case without bargaining power, the rst-order condi-
tions to the planners problem are cumbersome and hardly interpretable. Hence, I rst
perform a reasonable calibration of the model. I then rely on numerical simulations of the
optimal policy for di¤erent values of the bargaining power of workers in order to provide
a number of key qualitative insights.
4.2 Calibration
Empirical studies have provided some support for a constant elasticity of the matching
rate with respect to the unemployment rate (Petrongolo Pissarides 2001). Let  be this
xed elasticity. We must therefore have:
q() = q0
 , (34)
where the two parameters, q0 and , need to be calibrated. Following Mortensen and
Pissarides (2003), the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be uniform on
[ ; 1]; hence its c.d.f. is:
G(x) =
x   
1   : (35)
Finally, I use a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility
function with CRRA coe¢ cient :
v(x) =
x1    1
1   : (36)
I calibrate my model to the US economy assuming that, currently, the government
only intervenes to provide unemployment benets b which are entirely nanced by payroll
taxes  . I perform a monthly calibration. I set r = 0:004, which implies a yearly interest
rate of 4.8%. Workers are characterized by a coe¢ cient  of relative risk aversion equal
to 3. I take the elasticity  of the matching function to be equal to 0.5, which is in
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the mid-range of the empirical estimates reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The calibration is performed assuming that workers and rms have equal bargaining
power, i.e.  = 0:5. Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue that the income-equivalent of being
unemployed is equal to 71% of the average match productivity, a third of which consists
of unemployment benets. I therefore impose z+ b = 0:71y=(1 u) together with 2b = z,
where y=(1   u) is the average match productivity. To balance the government budget
constraint, the payroll taxes  must be set equal to bu=(1 u). The ow cost c of posting
a vacancy is calibrated such that the equilibrium market tightness  is equal to 0.72,
consistently with the empirical evidence reported by Pissarides (2009). As in Mortensen
and Pissarides (2003), I assume that the productivity of a new match can drop by up to
35% when it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock, i.e.  = 0:65. Finally, the scale parameter
q0 of the matching function and the rate  of occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks are jointly
calibrated such that the monthly job nding rate is 0.45 while the unemployment rate is
5.5%, consistently with the empirical evidence provided by Shimer (2012). The parameter
values implied by this calibration are all displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Exogenous parameter values
r   z c  q0  
0:004 3 0:5 0:471 0:519 0:032 0:530 0:65
4.3 Simulation
The simulation results are reported in Table 2. As, in this section, I want to investigate
the impact of the bargaining power  of workers on the optimal policy, I report the
solution to the planners problem for four di¤erent values of . The initial case,  = 0,
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corresponds to the rst-best benchmark of Section 3.
Table 2: Optimal policy under Nash bargaining
 0 0:25 0:5 0:75
 0:902 0:780 0:529 0:259
R 0:934 0:932 0:925 0:904
u (%) 4:829 5:140 6:022 7:814
y 0:946 0:942 0:932 0:910
w 0:946 0:952 0:956 0:957
b 0:475 0:363 0:281 0:218
 0:0003 0:0004 0:0008 0:0024
F 1:685 1:441 1:181 0:833
H 0:755 0:679 0:484 0:129
F  H 0:930 0:762 0:697 0:704
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0:15 0:73 2:31
Gross Job Flow 0:0243 0:0241 0:0232 0:0211
(1  u)=ub (%) 1:35 1:78 4:26 12:92
The welfare loss is computed as the proportional decline in consumption in the rst-best
case necessary to reach the new level of welfare. For example, when  = 0:5, welfare is
equal to what it would be in the rst-best allocation,  = 0, with consumption decreased
by 0.73%. In steady state, the gross job ow is given by uq() or, equivalently, by
(1 u)G(R). Finally, the last row reports the share of unemployment insurance expenses
nanced by payroll taxes.
It can easily be checked that, when the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when  =  =
0:5, output maximization requires F = H, such as to leave the rate of job creation
undistorted.25 This would characterize the welfare maximizing policy if workers were
risk-neutral. However, as can be seen from Table 2, such is not the case with risk-averse
workers. Thus, when workers have some bargaining power, there is a trade-o¤ between
output maximization and insurance provision. More precisely, the planner sets layo¤
taxes higher than hiring subsidies in order to reduce entry and, hence, market tightness.
This decreases wages26, which by relaxing the resource constraint, allows an increase in
the level of unemployment benets.
In a nutshell, the workers bargaining power introduces a discrepancy between the
wage rate w and the income equivalent z + b of being unemployed, which is detrimental
25This can easily be seen by comparing the decentralized job creation condition (33) to the rst-best
job creation condition (10).
26This can be seen from expression (31) for the wage rate while recalling that q() is a decreasing
function of .
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to the provision of insurance. The planner responds by reducing market tightness such
as to reduce this discrepancy, which enhances the provision of insurance.
Thus, when  is low, F is higher than H in order to compensate for the failure of
the Hosios condition to hold (as discussed in Section 3). As  increases, this becomes a
smaller concern, but insu¢ cient insurance becomes a bigger one. The planner then wants
to decrease market tightness which becomes the main reason why F exceeds H.
Note that F is so much higher than H that it generates su¢ cient surplus to nance
almost entirely the unemployment benets. This is true even though, for all values of ,
the magnitude of F only amounts to less than two months of wage payments. This is
more than su¢ cient to pay for the unemployment benets given that either  is low and
the expected length of unemployment is short or  is high and the replacement ratio is
low.
The reservation threshold R declines slightly with bargaining power in order to com-
pensate for the imperfect provision of insurance. Indeed, at the margin, a decrease in
R reduces the rate of unemployment and, by (31), also reduces the gap between w and
z+ b. But, this fall in R comes at the cost of a more sclerotic labor market characterized
by a lower reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, as shown by the
lower gross job ow.
The reduction in the rate of job creation being larger than that of job destruc-
tion, unemployment increases with . Output, which in steady state can be written
as y = (1   u)
h
G(R) +
R 1
R
sdG(s)
i
, declines because a smaller number of people work,
i.e. unemployment is higher, and the average productivity of employed workers is also
reduced due to a lower reservation threshold.
In other words, the downward adjustment in  and R, which enhances the provision of
insurance, hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, which
reduces aggregate output. This is the essence of the trade-o¤ between insurance and
production. Also, it should be emphasized that a moderate amount of private savings
is likely to reduce, but certainly not to eliminate, the demand for insurance. Thus, a
trade-o¤ would remain, albeit of a smaller magnitude, and the key qualitative insights
about the optimal policy would presumably remain unaltered.
The wages and the job destruction threshold could be determined by directed search,
rather than by Nash bargaining. In such an environment, competitive market makers
jointly choose the wage schedule, the threshold and the length of queues, equal to 1=q(),
such as to maximize the expected utility of an unemployed worker subject to a free entry
condition for rms; or more formally:
max
ffw(x)gx2[R;1];R;g
rU subject to V = 0: (37)
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This yields exactly the same equations as (30), (31) and (32) with  replaced by . Thus,
in Table 5, directed search corresponds to the case where  =  = 0:5. As implied by
Corollary 1, directed search and the associated Hosios condition fail to implement a rst-
best allocation of resources in an economy with risk-averse workers as they fail to entail
a su¢ cient provision of insurance.
4.4 Robustness
So far, I have assumed that the rm is able to commit to a xed employment contract. As
a robustness check, it would be interesting to relax the commitment assumption, which
would imply that wage bargaining occurs whenever the match is hit by a productivity
shock. However, in such circumstances, due to risk-aversion, the resulting bargaining
problem is intractable.27 Thus, following Blanchard and Tirole (2003), I consider that
the wage rate is determined by surplus splitting (which would be the outcome of Nash
bargaining without commitment if workers were risk-neutral).
In Appendix D, I solve numerically for the policy that maximizes the welfare of risk-
averse workers when the wage rate is determined by surplus splitting. I rst focus on the
standard case where wage bargaining occurs each time the match is hit by a productivity
shock. Alternatively, in the absence of commitment, it could seem natural to assume that
the wage rate is re-bargained at each instant. In this latter case, the layo¤ tax raises the
wage rate of the worker as soon as he is recruited. In both cases, it turns out that the
main ndings from the above analysis remain robust to the relaxation of the commitment
assumption (as can be seen from Table D2 and D3, respectively). In particular, the layo¤
tax remains above the hiring subsidy such as to depress the rate of job creation which
improves the provision of insurance.
Finally, I investigate the optimal policy under a naive surplus splitting rule whereby
the wage rate at each instant is constrained to be independent of market tightness.28
Interestingly, it turns out that, in that case, market tightness  and the reservation
threshold R turn out to be almost independent of the bargaining power of workers (see
Table D4). Moreover, when the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when  = 0:5, the layo¤
taxes and hiring subsidies are almost equal to each other. This suggests that, without
the general equilibrium e¤ect of market tightness on wages, there is hardly any trade-o¤
between output maximization and insurance provision.
27With risk-averse workers, the Nash bargaining problem yields a continuum of integral equations (one
for each x 2 [R; 1) and two for x = 1) which jointly determines the equilibrium wage rate as a function
of productivity. These would then have to be added as constraints to the planners problem.
28For a match of productivity x, the wage rate is assumed to be equal to w(x) =  [x   ]+(1 ) [z + b].
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5 Moral Hazard
So far, we have seen that, when workers have some bargaining power, the planner is
always seeking to improve the provision of insurance. However, reducing the level of
insurance might be a virtue if it increases the search intensity of unemployed workers.
Indeed, concerns about the moral hazard e¤ects of unemployment insurance have been
at the heart of the literature on the topic. Hence, this section characterizes the optimal
policy when job search monitoring is not available and, hence, when the unemployed
freely choose their search intensity.
5.1 Determination of Search Intensity
Let s denote the average search intensity of the unemployed. Vacant jobs and unemployed
workers now get matched at rate29:
m = m(su; v); (38)
where the matching function satises the same properties as before. Vacancies become
lled at rate:
m(su; v)
v
= m
s

; 1

= q(; s); (39)
where market tightness remains dened as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, i.e.
 = v=u.
Unemployed worker i who searches with intensity si nds a job at rate:
~q(; s; si) =
si
s
m(su; v)
u
(40)
=
si
s
q(; s):
The expected utility Ui of unemployed worker i is implicitly determined by:
rUi = v(z + b)  (si) + ~q(; s; si) [W (1)  Ui] ; (41)
where (:) denotes an increasing and convex cost of search, with (0) = 0(0) = 0, and
W (1) is the value of a new job to a worker. The rst-order condition for search intensity
is:
 0(si) + @~q(; s; si)
@si
[W (1)  Ui] = 0: (42)
Hence, using the symmetry which prevails in equilibrium, i.e. si = s and Ui = U , the
29The intensity of job advertising made by vacant rms is exogenously set to 1 as, even if endogenously
determined, it would not be a¤ected by any policy parameters; cf. Pissarides (2000, chapter 5.3).
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search intensity of unemployed workers is implicitly determined by:
s0(s) = q(; s) [W (1)  U ] : (43)
5.2 The Planners Problem
The employment contract
n
fw(x)gx2[R;1] ; R
o
is still determined by Nash bargaining as
specied in (27) with the value of unemployment now given by:
rU = v(z + b)  (s) + q(; s) [W (1)  U ] (44)
where s is determined by (43). Proceeding as before (cf. Appendix B), it can easily be
established that the wage rate is still independent of productivity, i.e. w(x) = w for all
x 2 [R; 1], that this wage rate is determined by:
v(w)  v(z + b) + (s)
v0(w)
= [r + G(R) + q(; s)]

1  
c
q(; s)
, (45)
and that the job destruction threshold solves:
R = w+    rF   
r + 
Z 1
R
(x R)dG(x)  r + G(R)
r + G(R) + q(; s)
v(w)  v(z + b) + (s)
v0(w)
.
(46)
Substituting the value of employment to a worker (29) and the value of unemployment
(44) into the rst-order condition for search intensity (43) yields:
s0(s) = q(; s)
v(w)  v(z + b) + (s)
r + G(R) + q(; s)
. (47)
Using the wage equation (45), this expression can be simplied to:
s0(s) =

1   cv
0(w). (48)
The planners problem is the same as in the previous section with s as a new control
variable and either (47) or (48) as an additional constraint.30
30The other changes are that search intensity should be included in the matching function, i.e. q()
should be replaced by q(; s), and the search cost (s) should be subtracted from the objective function
for a mass u of unemployed workers, i.e. the last term of the objective should be u [v(z + b)  (s)]
instead of uv(z + b).
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5.3 Calibration
The convex search cost is assumed to be given by a power function:
(s) = k
s+1
 + 1
, (49)
where k and  are positive parameters. I follow the same procedure as in the previous
section to calibrate the model. In addition, I choose k such that s is normalized to 1
and  such that the elasticity of the unemployment duration with respect to the benet
level is equal to 0.3, consistently with the recent empirical evidence provided by Landais
(2012).31 The parameter values resulting from this calibration are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Exogenous parameter values with moral hazard
r   z c  q0  k 
0:004 3 0:5 0:467 0:761 0:036 0:530 0:65 0:666 1:564
31In their literature survey, Krueger and Meyer (2002) argue that it is reasonable to assume an elasticity
of 0.5. However, this elasticity is usually estimated for workers who do qualify for unemployment benets.
Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), to calibrate the model, I have assumed a low value of b in order to
capture the fact that, in practice, many unemployed workers do not receive any unemployment benets.
If only two thirds of unemployed workers are eligible for benets, then their benet level is equal to 3=2b
(while the others get nothing). If a 1% increase in 3=2b raises the average length of unemployment by
0.5%, then a 1% increase in b raises the average length of unemployment by 0.33%. This can be seen
as an alternative justication for targeting a fairly low elasticity, i.e. a 0.3 elasticity of 1=q(; s) with
respect to b.
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5.4 Simulation
The simulation results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Optimal policy under Nash bargaining with moral hazard
 0:125 0:25 0:3623 0:5 0:75
 1:164 1:015 0:857 0:659 0:315
R 0:873 0:883 0:885 0:882 0:858
u (%) 5:036 4:952 5:080 5:398 6:482
y 0:928 0:932 0:931 0:927 0:908
w 0:910 0:923 0:931 0:937 0:942
b 0:369 0:321 0:285 0:247 0:190
s 0:584 0:758 0:865 0:966 1:106
 0:0002 0:0001 0:0003 0:0009 0:0036
F 2:286 1:859 1:569 1:241 0:497
H 1:452 1:175 0:959 0:694 0:057
F  H 0:834 0:684 0:610 0:547 0:441
Welfare Loss (%) 0:88 0:15 0 0:20 1:86
Gross Job Flow 0:0220 0:0230 0:0232 0:0229 0:0203
(1  u)=ub (%) 1:16 0:86 2:08 6:28 27:32
The welfare of workers is maximized for  = 0:3623. To see why there is such a welfare
maximizing value of  2 (0; 1), note that, when the bargaining power of workers is very
low, the provision of insurance is too high which results in excessively small incentives to
search while unemployed. Conversely, a high bargaining power of workers results in an
excessively small provision of insurance. Thus,  = 0:3623 optimally balances the trade-
o¤ between the provision of insurance and the provision of incentives to search while
unemployed. The corresponding allocation is the one that the planner would choose to
implement if he could freely set the wage rate.32 It can therefore be seen as the optimal
allocation under moral hazard. The (consumption equivalent) welfare loss that is reported
in Table 4 is computed relative to that welfare maximizing benchmark.
When workers have a smaller bargaining power,  < 0:3623, search intensity is ex-
cessively low which is partially o¤set by the planner choosing a higher market tightness
than in the benchmark. Indeed, a higher market tightness reduces the provision of insur-
ance33, which boosts the returns to search. Conversely, when  > 0:3623, search intensity
32Indeed, allowing  to be a control variable of the planner is equivalent to not imposing the equation
for the wage rate that results from Nash bargaining, (45), as a constraint to the planners problem.
33This can be seen from expression (45) for the wage rate while recalling that q(; s) is a decreasing
function of .
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is higher than in the optimal allocation. The previous intuitions, without moral hazard,
dominate again and the planner decreases market tightness in order to enhance the pro-
vision of insurance. Thus, for high values of , the introduction of moral hazard does not
modify the qualitative conclusions of the previous section about the key characteristics
of an optimal policy.
When the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when  = 0:5, output (net of search costs) is
again maximized when F = H. The fact that, with risk aversion, the planner chooses
to set layo¤ taxes higher than hiring subsidies conrms that he seeks to reduce mar-
ket tightness below the output maximizing level in order to enhance the provision of
insurance.
Interestingly, when  = 0:3623, the gross job ow is closed to being maximized.
Indeed, when  > 0:3623, market tightness is decreased which reduces the job creation
ow; when  < 0:3623, the low search intensity of unemployed workers also depresses the
job creation ow.
In sum, the simulation results have revealed that the force pushing for more insurance,
i.e. risk aversion, is only dominated by the force pushing for less insurance, i.e. moral
hazard, for  < 0:3623. It follows that moral hazard, and the resulting over provision of
insurance, is only a dominant concern for rather low values of .
Appendix E shows that this conclusion is robust to the relaxation of the commitment
assumption. Indeed, under surplus splitting, for each value of , the optimal allocation
is very similar to the one reported in Table 4 and the welfare of workers is maximized for
 = 0:34 (cf. Table E2 and E3).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated optimal policies in a dynamic search model of the labor
market with risk-averse workers. More precisely, I have focused on the joint derivation
of the optimal level of unemployment benets, layo¤ taxes, hiring subsidies and payroll
taxes.
I began by abstracting from moral hazard in order to focus on the general equilibrium
e¤ects of the di¤erent policy instruments. I have shown that the rst-best allocation of
resources can be implemented in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers.
In this situation, full insurance is provided and output is maximized. Layo¤ taxes are
higher than hiring subsidies in order to prevent an excessive entry of vacancies induced
by the absence of bargaining power of workers. The gap between layo¤ taxes and hiring
subsidies generates a budgetary surplus which is su¢ ciently large to nance nearly all
the unemployment benets; payroll taxes are therefore hardly needed.
The analysis being properly microfounded with risk-averse workers, it naturally denes
28
an optimal rate of unemployment which only coincides with the output maximizing rate
of unemployment when full insurance can be provided, i.e. when there is no trade-o¤
between the provision of insurance and the maximization of production.
When workers have some bargaining power, the planner wants to reduce wages in or-
der to relax the resource constraint and improve the level of unemployment benets. In
particular, this is achieved by reducing market tightness which lowers wages, as desired,
but also hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. Introduc-
ing moral hazard adds a counteracting force to the model. When workers have a very low
bargaining power, it is typically desirable to increase market tightness and to boost wages
in order to enhance the incentive to search while unemployed. However, when workers
have more substantial bargaining power, under-provision of insurance, rather than moral
hazard, remains the primary concern of the planner.
By emphasizing the liquidity e¤ect of unemployment insurance, Chetty (2008) has
already argued that the issue of moral hazard might have been over-emphasized in the
literature. The present paper adds to this by showing that general equilibrium e¤ects on
job creation, job destruction and wages might be at least as important for the determi-
nation of the optimal labor market policy.34
There are essentially two reasons which could justify setting layo¤ taxes higher than
hiring subsidies; in which case the di¤erence between the two could cover at least some
of the costs of providing unemployment benets. First, to compensate for the failure
of the Hosios condition to hold; or, in other words, to reduce entry in order to save on
recruitment costs when the bargaining power of workers is lower than the elasticity of
the matching function. Second, in order to reduce wages, by reducing market tightness,
when the provision of insurance is insu¢ cient. Importantly, as the bargaining power of
workers increases, the rst reason becomes less relevant while the second becomes more
important. This is why layo¤ taxes exceed hiring subsidies in all realistic calibrations of
the model and for any bargaining power of workers.
Some important issues are left for further research. First, an accurate empirical
knowledge of the main determinants of wages, at the macroeconomic level, is key for
the optimal design of labor market policies.35 Knowing, quantitatively, how wages are
a¤ected by market tightness or by the di¤erent policy instruments is obviously essential
if the planner wants to increase the provision of insurance at the smallest cost in terms
of output. The precise specication of wages also crucially a¤ects the implementability
constraints. For instance, if layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies are passed on to workers
34Krusell Mukoyama Sahin (2010) reach a similar conclusion, even though they abstract from the
possibility of using hiring subsidies and ring taxes to a¤ect the rates of job creation and job destruction.
35Blanchower and Oswald (1994) provide extensive evidence of the negative impact of unemployment
on wages. However, their work does not control for the number of vacancies and, hence, cannot identify
the impact of market tightness on wages.
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through adjustment in wages, then they have a much smaller e¤ect on the job creation
and job destruction decisions of rms.
Throughout this paper, I have only considered time invariant policy instruments. In
fact, in a dynamic context, it would be interesting to allow the level of unemployment
benets to be a¤ected by the length of unemployment and that of layo¤ taxes and hiring
subsidies to depend on the age of the match, among other things. Also, in the proposed
model, the length of unemployment does not directly matter, only its rate does.36 This
could be relaxed by assuming that the level of human capital depreciates during an
unemployment spell37 or, more simply, by assuming that workers have a preference for
shorter spells even if this is associated with a higher probability of being unemployed.
The length of unemployment being decreasing in market tightness, the resulting optimal
policy would presumably advocate for a smaller reduction in the rate of job creation.
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A Payroll Tax in First-Best Policy
Before deriving (25), it is necessary to rewrite the expression for the optimal value of b
given by equation (9).
b = y   cu  z(1  u)
= y   cu 

R  ()
1  ()c +

r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s)

(1  u)
= (1  u) r
r + 

y
1  u  R

+
()
1  ()c(1  u) + G(R)(1  u)
1 R
r + 
  cu
= (1  u) r
r + 

y
1  u  R

+ q()

1 R
r + 
  c
q()

The second line was derived by using the optimal job destruction condition (11) to get
rid of z. Note that, combining (6a) and (6b) while imposing the steady state conditions
_u = 0 and _y = 0, implies that the steady state level of output can be expressed as
y = (1  u)
h
G(R) +
R 1
R
sdG(s)
i
. To obtain the third line, and to get rid of the integral,
I have used that expression for the steady state level of output and then rearranged the
terms. Finally, to get the last line, I have used equation (12) to rewrite the second term
of the third line and used the fact that, in steady state, G(R)(1 u) = q()u to rewrite
the third term of the third line.
Substituting this expression for b in (24) yields equation (25).
B Solving the Nash Bargaining Problem
Before solving the bargaining problem, we need to nd an expression for Wi(1) and Ji(1)
as a function of the wage rates and of the job destruction threshold. Taking the di¤erence
between the expression for Wi(x), as given by (29), evaluated at productivity s and the
same expression at productivity 1 yields:
Wi(s) =
v(wi(s))  v(wi(1))
r + 
+Wi(1):
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Substituting this expression into the value of employment for a newly recruited worker,
given by (29) with x = 1, gives:
Wi(1) =
1
r + G(Ri)

v(wi(1))  
r + 
Z 1
Ri
[v(wi(1))  v(wi(s))] dG(s) + G(Ri)U

:
Similarly, using (13) with the wage indexed to productivity, the value of a rm when the
match is created is given by:
Ji(1) =
1
r + G(Ri)


1  (wi(1) + )  
r + 
Z 1
Ri
[(1  wi(1))  (s  wi(s))] dG(s)  G(Ri)F

:
These two expressions imply that:
@Wi(1)
@wi(1)
=
v0(wi(1))
r + 
and
@Ji(1)
@wi(1)
=   1
r + 
; (B1)
also, for all x 2 [Ri; 1), we have:
@Wi(1)
@wi(x)
=
v0(wi(x))g(x)dx
[r + ] [r + G(Ri)]
and
@Ji(1)
@wi(x)
=   g(x)dx
[r + ] [r + G(Ri)]
; (B2)
where g(x)  dG(x)=dx; and nally:
@Wi(1)
@Ri
=   g(Ri)
[r + G(Ri)]
2 (B3)


v(wi(Ri))  rU + 
r + 
Z 1
Ri
[v(wi(s))  v(wi(Ri))] dG(s)

;
and:
@Ji(1)
@Ri
=   g(Ri)
[r + G(Ri)]
2 (B4)


Ri   (wi(Ri) + ) + rF + 
r + 
Z 1
Ri
[(s  wi(s))  (Ri   wi(Ri))] dG(s)

:
The rst-order conditions for the wage wi(x) and the threshold Ri are obtained by
di¤erentiating the logarithm of the Nash product in (27). This yields:

Wi(1)  U
@Wi(1)
@wi(x)
=
1  
Ji(1) +H   V

  @Ji(1)
@wi(x)

for all x 2 [Ri; 1]; (B5)
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and:

Wi(1)  U
@Wi(1)
@Ri
=
1  
Ji(1) +H   V

 @Ji(1)
@Ri

: (B6)
Now that the rst-order conditions and the corresponding derivatives have been derived,
we can drop the subscript i and use the fact that in equilibrium, from symmetry, wi(x) =
w(x) and Ri = R.
Substituting the derivatives (B1) or (B2) into the rst-order condition for the wage
rate (B5) immediately reveals that the wage rate is independent of productivity, as stated
by equation (30). Note that, with a xed wage, the value functions for unemployment
and employment, i.e. (28) and (29), jointly imply that:
W   U = v(w)  v(z + b)
r + G(R) + q()
. (B7)
Substituting this expression together with V = 0, J(1) +H = c=q() and the derivatives
of (B1) into the rst-order condition for the wage rate (B5) yields equation (31) which
implicitly determines the wage rate.
Note that the derivative (B3) can be simplied by using the fact that, from (28) and
(B7), we have:
v(w)  rU = [r + G(R)] v(w)  v(z + b)
r + G(R) + q()
. (B8)
Substituting V = 0, J(1) +H = c=q(), (B7), the derivative of the workers welfare (B3)
simplied with (B8) and the derivative of the rms expected prots (B4) into the rst-
order condition for the threshold (B6) gives an expression for the equilibrium threshold
which can be simplied using (31) to give (32).
C The Decentralized Job Creation Condition When
Workers Have Some Bargaining Power
Taking the di¤erence between the value of employment to a rm of productivity x, (13),
and that of a rm with productivity R yields:
J(x) =
x R
r + 
+ J(R). (C1)
Substituting this expression into the value of employment to a rm, (13), with produc-
tivity R gives:
(r + )J(R) = R  (w + ) + 
r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s) +  [1 G(R)] J(R)  G(R)F ,
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or equivalently:
[r + G(R)] J(R) = R  (w + ) + 
r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s)  G(R)F . (C2)
Substituting (31) into (32), the job destruction condition can be written as:
R = w +    rF   
r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s)  [r + G(R)] 
1  
c
q()
.
Substituting this expression into (C2) yields:
J(R) =  F   
1  
c
q()
.
Combining this expression with (C1) implies:
J(1) =
1 R
r + 
  F   
1  
c
q()
. (C3)
By the free-entry condition, V = 0, and the value of a vacancy, (17), the job creation
condition is:
J(1) +H =
c
q().
(C4)
Finally, combining (C3) and (C4) yields the decentralized job creation condition (33).
D Optimal Policy under Surplus Splitting
Surplus splitting is the outcome of Nash bargaining without commitment when workers
are risk neutral. Let ~U denote the net present value of expected income of an unemployed
worker, i.e. the value of unemployment to a risk-neutral worker. Similarly, the initial
value of a match to a rm and to a (risk-neutral) worker are denoted by J0(1) and ~W0(1),
respectively. The corresponding subsequent values, after an idiosyncratic shock has set
the productivity of the match to x, are J(x) and ~W (x).
Wage bargaining occurs when the worker is recruited and each time the match is hit
by a productivity shock. The initial wage, w0(1), is determined by the following surplus
splitting rule:
(1  )
h
~W0(1)  ~U
i
=  [J0(1) +H   V ] , (D1)
which captures the fact that, in case no agreement is reached, the rm does not receive
the hiring subsidy but does not have to pay the ring tax. Proceeding as in Mortensen
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Pissarides (2003) or Pissarides (2000, chapter 9), it can easily be established that38:
w0(1) =  [1 + c      F + (r + )H] + (1  ) [z + b] . (D2)
Once the match has been hit by an idiosyncratic shock, the surplus splitting rule for a
match with productivity x becomes:
(1  )
h
~W (x)  ~U
i
=  [J(x) +H   V ] , (D3)
which captures the fact that, in case the match dissolves, the rm has to pay the layo¤
tax. This yields:
w(x) =  [x+ c    + rF ] + (1  ) [z + b] . (D4)
It can easily be shown that, under surplus splitting, the job destruction conditions,
determined by J(R) =  F , becomes:
R = z + b+  +

1   c   rF  

r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s), (D5)
while the job creation condition, determined by the free-entry condition V = 0, is:
(1  )

1 R
r + 
+H   F

=
c
q()
. (D6)
To determine the optimal policy, the implementability conditions, i.e. (D5), (D6) and
(20), must be added as constraints to the planners problem. Let n denote the number of
matches which have not been hit by an idiosyncratic shock yet and with prevailing wage
w0(1). The optimal policy under surplus splitting is therefore the solution to:
max
f;R;b; ;F;Hg
Z 1
0
e t

nv(w0(1)) + (1  u  n)
Z 1
R
v(w(x))
1 G(R)dG(x) + uv(z + b)

dt (D7)
38The layo¤ tax enters the expression for the initial wage rate as it a¤ects the rms expected prots
from a newly created match.
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subject to _u = G(R)(1  u)  q()u (D8a)
_n = q()u  n (D8b)
_y = q()u+ (1  u)
Z 1
R
sdG(s)  y (D8c)
nw0(1) + (1  u  n)
Z 1
R
w(x)
1 G(R)dG(x) + ub = y   cu (D8d)
R = z + b+  +

1   c   rF  

r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s) (D8e)
(1  )

1 R
r + 
+H   F

=
c
q()
(D8f)
(1  u) + (1  u)G(R)F = ub+ uq()H (D8g)
where the expressions for the wage rate, (D2) and (D4), should be substituted into the
objective (D7) and into the resource constraint (D8d). The second constraint (D8b),
which did not previously appear, keeps track of the dynamics of n.
Before performing a simulation of the optimal policy, the model needs to be calibrated.
Following the same procedure as in Section 4.2 yields the parameters of Table D1.
Table D1: Exogenous parameter values under surplus splitting
r   z c  q0  
0:004 3 0:5 0:472 0:338 0:029 0:530 0:65
The simulation results are reported in Table D2 for four di¤erent value of  (where, again,
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 = 0 corresponds to the rst-best benchmark).
Table D2: Optimal policy under surplus splitting
 0 0:25 0:5 0:75
 1:421 1:110 0:557 0:207
R 0:950 0:947 0:938 0:915
u (%) 3:800 4:251 5:726 8:407
n 0:823 0:814 0:777 0:694
y 0:959 0:954 0:938 0:907
Average Wage 0:958 0:963 0:965 0:960
b 0:486 0:360 0:291 0:255
 0:0002  0:0011  0:0041  0:0074
F 1:410 1:244 1:220 1:353
H 0:650 0:556 0:314  0:040
F  H 0:760 0:688 0:905 1:393
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0:17 0:93 2:81
Gross Job Flow 0:0240 0:0237 0:0227 0:0203
(1  u)=ub (%) 1:12  6:84  23:00  31:53
These results are largely consistent with the one that were obtained under commitment
(cf. Table 2 of Section 4).
A second possibility is that the wage rate is re-bargained at each instant. This implies
that newly employed workers are being paid w(1) as given by (D4) instead of w0(1)
given by (D2). The only implementability condition that is modied is the job creation
condition which becomes:
(1  )1 R
r + 
+H   F = c
q()
. (D9)
Thus, the planners problem is as above, (D7), with w0(1) replaced by w(1) and (D8f)
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replaced by (D9). The simulation results are reported in Table D3.
Table D3: Optimal policy under surplus splitting with immediate wage renegotiation
 0 0:25 0:5 0:75
 1:421 1:109 0:555 0:206
R 0:950 0:949 0:948 0:942
u (%) 3:800 4:279 5:915 9:168
n 0:823 0:819 0:801 0:757
y 0:959 0:954 0:937 0:904
Average Wage 0:958 0:964 0:966 0:963
b 0:486 0:355 0:284 0:245
 0:0002 0:0041 0:0102 0:0210
F 1:410 1:060 0:726 0:404
H 0:650 0:589 0:416 0:253
F  H 0:760 0:471 0:309 0:151
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0:18 0:98 2:98
Gross Job Flow 0:0240 0:0239 0:0234 0:0221
(1  u)=ub (%) 1:12 25:93 56:99 85:13
The allocation of resources is almost identical to that of the previous case. The main
di¤erence lies in the level of the policy instruments F , H and  . In particular, the di¤er-
ence between layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies is smaller than before. This is primarily
due to the larger impact that this di¤erence has on the rate of job creation (as can be
seen by comparing the new job creation condition (D9) with the previous one (D6)). In-
deed, with immediate wage renegotiation, these policy instruments have a smaller e¤ect
on wages and, hence, a larger e¤ect on rms. This explains why F   H does not need
to be as large as before to reduce  to its desired level. Additionally, with immediate
wage renegotiation, hiring subsidies cease to increase initial wages and layo¤ taxes cease
to decrease them. Hence, when workers have strong bargaining power, it is no longer
necessary to maintain high layo¤ taxes and low hiring subsidies to prevent these initial
wages from being too high, which would be detrimental to insurance. Finally, F   H
being smaller than before, a signicant share of unemployment benets now need to be
nanced from payroll taxes.
Finally, I determine the optimal policy under a naive surplus splitting rule whereby
the wage rate is constrained to be independent of market tightness. Thus, the wage rate
for a match with productivity x is given by:
w(x) =  [x   ] + (1  ) [z + b] . (D10)
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Note that the wage rate is lower under naive surplus splitting (D10) than under continuous
re-bargaining (D4) as market tightness and layo¤ taxes cease to have a positive impact.
This generates a mechanical improvement in the provision of insurance.
The job creation condition remain given by (D9) while the job destruction condition
becomes:
R = z + b+    rF
1    

r + 
Z 1
R
(s R)dG(s).
The simulation results are displayed in Table D4.
Table D4: Optimal policy under naive surplus splitting
 0 0:25 0:5 0:75
 1:421 1:422 1:423 1:424
R 0:950 0:950 0:951 0:952
u (%) 3:800 3:804 3:813 3:828
n 0:823 0:824 0:827 0:830
y 0:959 0:959 0:959 0:959
Average Wage 0:958 0:959 0:959 0:959
b 0:486 0:477 0:468 0:460
 0:0002 0:0095 0:0190 0:0284
F 1:410 1:052 0:690 0:336
H 0:650 0:679 0:708 0:736
F  H 0:760 0:373  0:018  0:400
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0:001 0:004 0:010
Gross Job Flow 0:0240 0:0241 0:0241 0:0242
(1  u)=ub (%) 1:12 50:52 102:44 155:06
Market tightness  and the productivity threshold R are almost independent of the bar-
gaining power of workers. Also, when the Hosios condition does hold, i.e. when  = 0:5,
layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies are virtually equal to each other.39 These ndings sug-
gest that, without the general equilibrium e¤ect of market tightness on wages, there is
hardly any trade-o¤ between output maximization and insurance provision.
39Indeed, when  = (), the decentralized job creation condition (D9) is identical to the output
maximizing job creation condition (10) provided that F = H. The slight discrepancy between F and H
that remains when  = (), and which results in payroll taxes covering 102.44% of the cost of providing
unemployment insurance rather than 100%, is due to the negative impact of payroll taxes on wages.
Hence, the government tries to increase those taxes a little in order to decrease wages which, through a
relaxation of the resource constraint, leads to an improvement in the level of unemployment benets.
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E Optimal Policy under Surplus Splitting and Moral
Hazard
Surplus splitting in the presence of moral hazard results in the following wage rates:
w0(1) =  [1 + c      F + (r + )H] + (1  ) [z + b  (s)] , (E1)
w(x) =  [x+ c    + rF ] + (1  ) [z + b  (s)] , (E2)
where the initial wage w0(1) applies until a shock occurs. The existence of the search cost
(s) lowers the value of unemployment, which is the outside option, and hence adversely
a¤ects wages.
Simple algebra reveals that search intensity is determined by the rst order condition:
s0(s) = q(; s)
E [v(w)]  v(z + b) + (s)
r + G(R) + q(; s)
, (E3)
where:
E [v(w)] =

1  
r + 
[1 G(R)]

v(w0(1)) +

r + 
Z 1
R
v(w(x))dG(x). (E4)
The planners problem is as in Appendix D, cf. (D7), with s as a new control variable
and (E3) as an additional constraint.40
Proceeding as in Section 5.2 to calibrate the model yields the parameter values of
Table E1.
Table E1: Exogenous parameter values under surplus splitting with moral hazard
r   z c  q0  k 
0:004 3 0:5 0:469 0:661 0:034 0:530 0:65 0:672 1:535
40The other changes are that search intensity should be included in the matching function, i.e. q()
should be replaced by q(; s); the search cost (s) should be subtracted from the objective function for a
mass u of unemployed workers, i.e. the last term of the objective should be u [v(z + b)  (s)] instead of
uv(z+ b); nally, z should be replaced by z  (s) in the decentralized job destruction condition, (D8e).
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The simulation results are reported in Table E2.
Table E2: Optimal policy under surplus splitting with moral hazard
 0:125 0:25 0:3384 0:5 0:75
 1:438 1:220 1:012 0:657 0:257
R 0:887 0:897 0:898 0:893 0:864
u (%) 4:526 4:443 4:644 5:318 7:066
n 0:646 0:674 0:676 0:658 0:570
y 0:937 0:941 0:939 0:931 0:905
Average wage 0:919 0:932 0:939 0:945 0:945
b 0:374 0:319 0:289 0:251 0:213
s 0:581 0:774 0:860 0:958 1:039
 0:0006  0:0003  0:0013  0:0034  0:0065
F 2:250 1:849 1:670 1:448 1:219
H 1:507 1:217 1:031 0:705 0:131
F  H 0:743 0:632 0:639 0:742 1:088
Welfare Loss (%) 0:86 0:11 0 0:32 2:31
Gross Job Flow 0:0219 0:0229 0:0230 0:0224 0:0194
(1  u)=ub (%) 3:60  2:23  9:45  24:26  40:04
Under an optimal labor market policy, the welfare of workers is maximized when  =
0:3384. The results of Table E2 are largely consistent with main conclusions drawn from
Table 4 of Section 5.
When surplus splitting occurs at each instant, newly employed workers are paid w(1)
as specied by (E2) rather than w0(1) given by (E1). The planners problem is obtained
by adding the constraint for search intensity, given by (E3) with w(1) replacing w0(1) in
(E4), to the corresponding problem of Appendix D.41 The simulation results with surplus
splitting at each instant are reported in Table E3.
41Appropriate adjustments for search intensity should be made as described in the previous footnote.
44
Table E3: Optimal policy under surplus splitting with immediate renegotiation and moral hazard
 0:125 0:25 0:3357 0:5 0:75
 1:399 1:202 1:009 0:657 0:259
R 0:885 0:897 0:899 0:898 0:879
u (%) 4:562 4:471 4:672 5:406 7:419
n 0:641 0:673 0:679 0:671 0:605
y 0:936 0:941 0:939 0:932 0:906
Average wage 0:919 0:933 0:939 0:946 0:949
b 0:374 0:319 0:289 0:249 0:208
s 0:579 0:774 0:860 0:965 1:054
 0:0016 0:0032 0:0042 0:0068 0:0126
F 2:214 1:741 1:507 1:143 0:660
H 1:502 1:251 1:097 0:834 0:479
F  H 0:712 0:490 0:411 0:309 0:180
Welfare Loss (%) 0:84 0:11 0 0:33 2:40
Gross Job Flow 0:0218 0:0229 0:0231 0:0228 0:0206
(1  u)=ub (%) 9:21 21:30 29:77 47:58 75:90
Here, the welfare of workers is maximized for  = 0:3357. For each value of , the
allocation is almost identical to the one obtained without immediate wage renegotiation.
The optimal setting of the policy instruments is di¤erent, but these di¤erences are similar
to those obtained between the corresponding tables without moral hazard (cf. Table D2
and D3).
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